Islamic Political Desecration

This article was previously published in Indonesian at 9/8/2004

The Indonesian Muslim’s thought about the relation between religion (Islam) and politics, have been in two mainstreams, the formal Islam (textual) and substantive Islam (liberal). Scripturalist Muslims tried to struggle for religious formalization. It means that in their point of view, Islam should paint life, and should not be a merely private religion. Islam must be assertive as the base of the nation, and it must be implemented in every sphere of national life. Inspired by the works of Sayyid Qutb (W.1966) and Abul A’la Al-Maududi (W. 1979). John L. Esposito said that (1990: 203) they have asserted the jargon that Islamic doctrine is self-sufficiency, hence establishing the Islamic state is a matter of religious doctrine.

In previous presidential elections, the candidates for president seemed not to raise the issue of religious formalization. But it does not mean that the “threat” of Islamic sharia formalization in Indonesia has died. The success of PKS in the 6^th position in the legislative election may emerge as the spirit of Islamic formalization in the future. The annual session of DPR/MPR in the Gus Dur era had ever been used by Islamic parties as momentum of Jakarta Charter resurgence although their lobby had failed. Islamic organizations of Maududian and Qutbian, like Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) and Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) are also active as outdoor lobbyers of sharia formalization. Then, what about the substantive Islamic view?

In fact, there is convergence point between formal Islam and substantive Islam so that Islam paints the society’s life and not merely private religion. However, both are different about how the objective can be actualized? The substantive-liberal circle tends to want Islam as an ethical basis to arrange the social life, without being involved further in formalization. To them, the form of state and political institution in Islamic view is not part of religious dogma, so it becomes sacred. Nevertheless, all are –using Ali Abdul Raziq terms—is naw’an lâ dîniy (profane matters) submitted by God to humans to be created for their benefit. This article tries to analyze the theological-historical roots of political desecration in Islam.

It seems that the starting point of relation between Islam and politic is interpretation of the missionary endeavor of Prophet in Medina. The question is this: was the Prophet a pure Messenger or was he a king at once? Did he establish a state? Is establishing a state part of the inherent task of prophetic mission? The answer is this: there is no lucid text explaining that the Prophet established an Islamic state and was a ruler or king at once. His main task was running the prophetic mission and not being a political ruler. If he really established the state as a religious necessity, why didn’t he talk about the concept of Islamic state? The fact that he succeeded to initiate Medina Charter, as told by Leonard Binder (1988: 142) is not the same as creating the prophetic regime”.

Medina cannot be called a state according to the modern political concept, since it did not recognize power distribution like trias politica (executive, legislative and judiciative). To Binder, Medina in that time was not a state, nor a dynasty, however it must have been something else which was unclear. Islamic history has many such vague and uncertain problems.

Transformation of the Islamic governmental system, from khilâfah toward dawlah (dynasty) seemed to be important to observe. Why did the “democratic” governmental system of al-khulafâur râsyidûn have a short life (only 30 years, including 5 months of temporary authority by Hasan bin Ali), while the dynastic system held out for six centuries and 24 years? The Umayyad dynasty held out for 89 years, since Muawiyah (661 M) until Marwan II (750 M). Meanwhile, Abbasid dynasty has a longer age, and held out through 535 years since Abul Abbas as-Shaffah (750 M) until al-Mu’tashim (1258 M).

Answering the above question, Abied al-Jabiri in Al-‘Aqlus Siyâsil ‘Arabî (Vol. III. 1992: 231, 259) proposed a hypothesis that the democratic model of governance of the four caliphate which is adopted from the leadership practice of the Prophet in Medina, was not compatible in that time. Sociologically, the Prophet’s democratic leadership was applicable only for the community of Mecca and Medina. They used to apply the tribal system and recruit their leaders on the base of primus interpares. It means that community will select only the best individuals. As the Islamic area developed into Damascus, Persia, Iraq and Egypt, in the time of four caliphates, the democratic system became no longer effective. This was because they were used to living within a decisive monarchy system like the Persian Kingdom (with the king being a religious leader at the same time) and the Eastern Roman Empire (the king submitted into the church authority).

In fact, democratic governance of four caliphs only runs normally and securely in two and half periods (period of Abu Bakar, Omar, and the beginning of Othman’s period), since the first and the second caliph were decisive rulers. Abu Bakar made an unpopular policy by announcing war toward the apostates (murtad), while Omar was the brave and firm figure. Post both figures, democracy ran abnormally and even emerged as chaos (al-fitnah al-kubrâ) since the caliphs were not decisive. On this point, Robert N. Bellah’s thesis saying that the democratic leadership of the Prophet in Medina was (too modern) for the time and therefore it was short aged, must be appreciated further.

The history told us that after successfully deceiving Ali in tahkeem court, Muawiyah made a strange decision. He left Medina toward Damascus, left the caliphate tradition –where several Prophet Companions opposed him—and substituted it with Persian monarchy called ‘ajam system (non-Arab) by Abied al-Jabiri. History indicates that Dawlah Umawiyah, the result of political creation and Mu’awiyah affirmation, can overcome chaos and be accepted by Sunni’s as a political reality legitimated in ‘âmul jamâ’ah (reconciliation age). The political creation of Mu’awiyah was subsequently the main choice of the Islamic rulers up to the modern era.

The above fact indicates that the form of state according to Islam is open, as long as it is capable of actualizing maqhâsidus syarî’ah (the objectives of sharia). The Republic of Egypt, Arab Saudi Monarchy, Malaysian Constitutional Monarchy, and Indonesian democracy are the variants of modern Muslim countries. The freedom of faith, tolerance, anti-discrimination, law enforcement, justice and human right are particular for maqhâsidus syarî’ah which mustbe campaigned for by the candidate of president, and actualized when they are selected. We cannot say that they substantially lead us by Islamic values when they do not perform them. []

Muhammad Sholehuddin, Lecturer of STIE Gempol Pasuruan, activist of GP Ansor Sidoarjo.

(Translated by Lanny Octavia, edited by Jonathan Zilberg)