U.S. Perspectives on Islam and Democracy Post-9-11

In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States, two countervailing views have come to dominate thinking in the U.S. regarding the potential for democratization in Muslim societies. On one side are those who argue that Americans have failed to understand the “threat of Islam” because they have been misled by a politicized academic community and a naïve foreign service. Many of those holding this view are skeptical of the compatibility of Islam and democracy. They assert that scholars should conduct more policy-applicable research in order to expose anti-democratic tendencies among emerging Islamist groups. They also support an aggressive U.S. foreign policy designed to “rollback” militant Islamist gains in various polities and sustain pro-US, anti-Islamist governments regardless of their character.

On the other side of the debate are those who argue that the United States’ failure to promote genuine democracy in various parts of the world and its support for authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East in particular has been the root cause of Islamist militancy and anti-American sentiment. They assert that support for democratization efforts within Muslim societies is long overdue. Many in this camp also argue that such support must be accompanied by significant changes in U.S. foreign policy. Their positions are generally based on the view that Islamic activism is likely to expand as a political force throughout the world for the foreseeable future, although it is becoming increasingly diverse with calls for greater participation in democratic political processes gradually eclipsing calls for armed struggle.

This short paper provides an overview of the principal arguments presented on both sides of this discourse. It is an introduction to recent works by several leading analysts in the U.S. who are working on democratization issues in the Muslim world. It is intended to provide insight into some of the ideas being debated within U.S. academic and foreign policy circles.

THE SKEPTICS

Bernard Lewis, Professor Emeritus at Princeton University, is one of the most prolific scholars working on Islamic history. At 87, he continues to publish extensively. In What Went Wrong: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East (2003) Lewis takes a historical approach in examining how Muslims failed to embrace modernity. Focusing on the late Ottoman period, he rejects the notion that colonialism was to blame for underdevelopment in Muslim societies and argues that it is Muslims own failure to embrace modernization and democracy that has resulted in the impoverishment of their civilization. He argues that if this situation is not reversed, Middle Easterners will find no escape from “a downward spiral of hate and spite, rage and self-pity, poverty and oppression.”

In his recent best seller, The Crisis of Islam: Holy War and Unholy Terror (2003), Lewis describes the evolution of anti-Western sentiment and the rise of the jihad movement in contemporary Muslim societies. Based on a New Yorker article entitled the Revolt of Islam (2001, November 19, Available on-line), the book explores militant Muslims’ view of how their civilization foundered. In this regard, he does a very good job of explaining the current conflict between “Islam and the West.” However, Lewis says little about how to transcend the crisis. While not closed to the possibility of Islamic reform, Lewis argues that, at present, free and fair elections would represent “the culmination, not the inauguration of the process of democratic development” in the Muslim world (p. 112). He declares, “For Islamists, democracy, expressing the will of the people, is the road to power, but it is a one-way road, on which there is no return, no rejection of the sovereignty of God, as exercised through his chosen representatives” (p. 111).

Martin Kramer, one of Bernard Lewis’s former students and current Editor of Middle East Quarterly, has become a leading figure in the movement to reevaluate how academics study, interpret, and involve themselves in Muslim affairs. In his Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America (The Washington Institute for Near East Studies: 2001), Kramer argues that American academics failed to predict or explain the potency of Islamic movements because they have focused on progressive, democracy-minded groups, which constitute only a small minority of Muslims.

Kramer describes the core chapters of his book as an attempt to “document and analyze the collective errors made by the academic experts in assessing Islamism and ‘civil society,’ two core issues that preoccupied the field in the 1990s.” He asserts that many scholars hyped the democratic potential of Muslim societies by interpreting Islamic associational groups as akin to civil society while shying away from commenting on Islamist terrorism. In particular, Kramer faults John Esposito and other “apologists” for providing texts that explain Islamist violence as being counter to Islam, while not offering any insight into why the Muslims who committed or applauded violent acts thought otherwise.

Kramer also develops an extensive critique of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978). Kramer argues that Said and other Western intellectuals are complicit in the growth of Islamists’ sweeping indictment of the West by providing intellectual ammunition against those deemed “enemies” of Islam (p. 46). He asserts that, as a result, it has become even more difficult for scholars, secularists, and progressive clerics throughout the Muslim world to achieve much progress in strengthening democratic institutions. He faults the American academic community, especially the Middle East Studies Association (MESA), for allowing Said’s ideas to influence Western scholarship to the degree that they have. Kramer argues that there has been an overemphasis on viewing knowledge as a function of power. He asserts that the notion that all scholarship is politically tainted has encouraged pseudo-intellectuals to unabashedly produce scholarly work that supports their political views. At the same time, he complains, the tendency to label scholarly work on Muslim affairs conducted by non-Muslims as “orientalism” has enabled politically biased Muslim scholars to gain disproportionate influence within Middle East Studies circles. Kramer argues that this situation has led the field into a state of stagnation and discouraged scholars from producing objective analyses of current Islamic movements. (For more information, see http://www.martinkramer.org).

Daniel Pipes is one of the most controversial observers of Muslim affairs at present. His strenuous efforts to confront “militant Islam” have put him at the center of recent debates on Islam and democracy. In his book, Militant Islam Reaches America (2002), Pipes advances a wide-ranging critique of the Muslim world. He argues, “As an ideology, militant Islam can claim none of the sanctity that Islam the religion enjoys. While remaining respectful of the Islamic faith, outsiders can in good conscience criticize and combat militant Islam” (p. 12). Nevertheless, it is clear from reading Pipes’ book that his criticisms are directed far beyond the militants. Pipes goes out of his way to insult Muslims generally by presenting a litany of charges against them. For example, he echoes early 20^th century Orientalist attacks on the Prophet Muhammad’s legitimacy as a spiritual leader. He also attempts to illustrate that terrorist inclinations have been part of Islamic civilization throughout history.

Pipes position on political Islam is to make no distinction between those involved in violent acts of terrorism and those seeking to attain power through other means. He argues that U.S. policymakers in the Clinton government received “bad advice” from analysts such as John Esposito and Graham Fuller who convinced them to open dialogue with militants in Palestine, Egypt, and Algeria. Pipes argues that such scholars made the mistake of differentiating between good and bad Islamists when such distinctions have no basis in fact. He argues that “moderate Islamists” are those who simply do not have any means of “acting ruthlessly to seize power immediately” (p. 47). He asserts that the apparent differences between various Islamists reflect a division of labor with “some seeking power through politics and others through intimidation” (p. 45).  Pipes quotes Tunisia’s authoritarian president as stating that the “final aim” of all Islamists is “the construction of a totalitarian, theocratic state” (p. 47). He also quotes an ambassador of Algeria’s military regime as stating that it is “misguided to distinguish between moderate and extremist Islamists. The goal of all is the same: to construct a pure Islamic state, which is bound to be theocracy and totalitarian” (p. 47).

Pipes urges U.S. action against militant Islam (Islamism). He argues that Islamism is a political ideology akin to Marxism-Leninism or fascism. For this reason, the U.S. must develop a clear foreign policy to address it while also clearly distinguishing Islamism from Islam the religion. Pipes stresses that the overriding goal of U.S. policy must be to keep Islamists from seizing power. He recommends the following policies to support this objective (p. 49-50):

1) Do not engage in official or public dialogue with Islamists because such dialogue works to “legitimize Islamists and confirm beliefs in Western weakness.”

2) Do not attempt to appease Islamists as this will lead to demands for further concessions and threaten public freedoms.

3) Do not help Islamists in the pursuit of short-term gains as the CIA did during the 1980s when it armed Islamist groups fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan.

4) Press militant Islamic states like Iran and the Sudan to reduce aggressiveness and end support for Islamist movements in countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, and Algeria.

5) Support groups and governments confronting militant Islam. Pipes argues that the U.S. should “stand by the non-Islamists, even when that means accepting, within limits, strong-arm tactics (as in Pakistan and Egypt), the aborting of elections (as in Algeria), and deportations (as in Israel). It also means supporting Turkey in its conflict with Iran and India against Pakistan on the Kashmir issue.” Pipes argues that the same is to be said for support for institutions and individuals working against Islamists. He adds that, again, this may entail working with some “less than Jeffersonian organizations, notably the People’s Mojahdin of Iran, despite the controversy that would probably arouse.”

6) Urge gradual democratization. Pipes argues that, rather than quick elections, the U.S. should press for more modest steps toward democracy focusing on support for the development of civil society. Goals should include expanding political participation, strengthening the rule of law including an independent judiciary, and increasing freedom of speech and religion, property rights, minority rights, and the right to form voluntary organizations.

The fact that Pipes has recently been nominated to the board of the U.S. Institute of Peace by the Bush administration demonstrates that his views hold certain currency among Washington policymakers. His nomination however has also touched off a heated controversy. Islamic civil rights groups have pointed out that Pipes has argued that Muslims should be subjected to greater surveillance than the general population in the United States. Nihad Awad, Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), stated that “no credible Muslim leader in the United States or around the world could cooperate with an organization in which Pipes has a decision-making role.” Awad warned that “instead of ‘increasing the prospects for long-term understanding between the Western and Islamic worlds’ (as USIP’s Special Initiative on the Muslim World program literature states), Pipes’ bigoted views have been instrumental in widening the divide between faiths and cultures.” The Washington Post Editorial Board called Pipes nomination “salt in the wound” of relations between Muslims and the U.S. It argued that if the White House does not rescind Pipe’s nomination then Congress should have the good sense to turn it down (2003, April 19, p. A-12.

Both Daniel Pipes and Martin Kramer have been involved in the founding of Campus Watch, an organization that monitors academics and university departments thought to unfairly denigrate Israel and provide justification for Islamic radicalism. Campus Watch claims that “Middle East studies in the United States has become the preserve of Middle Eastern Arabs, who have brought their views with them” to the U.S. The organization maintains a “Keep Us Informed” section on its website that encourages students to inform on their professors. It also compiles dossiers on American scholars whose views they oppose. High on the organization’s list is John Esposito, Professor of Islamic studies at Georgetown University. (For more information, see http://www.danielpipes.org ; http://www.campus-watch.org).

THE OPTIMISTS

John Esposito is Director of the Center for Muslim-Christian Relations at Georgetown University. He has worked for years to document democratization efforts within the Islamic world, provide opportunities for Muslims to communicate their views, and promote a balanced understanding of Muslim affairs. Esposito has edited several volumes on contemporary Islamic thought since September 11, 2001.

Most recently, Esposito edited Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East (2003). The book explores the “re-islamization” of the public sphere in various national contexts. Esposito’s own contribution, entitled “Islam and Civil Society,” discusses the various ways in which Islamic activists have sought to “Islamize politics and society through the creation of political parties and professional associations as well as social welfare agencies and projects” (p. 5). He observes that various authoritarian regimes have tended to view these developments as a threat. However, he notes that elements within the Iranian government have provided “a major example of the mobilizing of power democratization and civil society,” while at the same time other elements resemble corrupt secular regimes. Esposito expresses guarded optimism that Islamic governance that grows out of civil society movements rather than violent revolutionary movements may prove to facilitate greater democratization, public participation, and civil society development.

Graham Fuller is a former Vice-Chair of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. He left government service over a decade ago and has more recently served as an analyst at RAND. He is considered an expert on geopolitics in the Muslim world having published several volumes on the topic. He also has a deep understanding of Muslim culture after living in Muslim polities for fourteen years and visiting every predominately Muslim country on the planet.

Fuller’s recent book, The Future of Political Islam (2003), expresses one of the most sanguine views of the phenomenon. He argues that, like it or not, “Islamism…represents the single most important force for political change in the Muslim world. He states, “Political Islam in all of its forms represents the uncertain beginnings of a vital process in which Islamic thinking comes to terms with multiple aspects of Western political thinking and institutions, expanding the range of its own outlook and activities—in both disturbing and heartening ways. The process in historical terms remains nascent, but it represents nothing less than the beginning of an intellectual reformation in Islamic thought” (p. 7).

It should be noted that Fuller uses the term “Islamism” as synonymous with “political Islam” (as most scholars have since Olivier Roy’s 1994 classic, The Failure of Political Islam). However, Fuller employs these terms in their broadest scope by referring to “anyone who believes that Islam has something important to say about how political and social life should be constituted and who attempts to implement that interpretation in some way” (p. 47). While I do not necessarily agree with his use of terms, his argument is detailed and persuasive.

Fuller asserts that for many reasons Islamism is currently the only realistic alternative movement capable of countering authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. He argues that an Islamist framework is the most likely vehicle for advancing political ideas on questions of just and accountable governance. He is optimistic that Islamist groups will increasingly find compatibility between the values of Islam and liberal democracy. He cites self-interest as one of the key factors in this as Islamists have begun to realize the benefit of political participation and the expansion of human rights. He argues that for this reason, in spite of their initial caution, some Islamists may very well end up playing an integral role in promoting liberal democracy within the Muslim world. Fuller emphasizes that Islamism is becoming increasingly diverse. Thus, one should not necessarily expect that radical militants of the Islamist tradition will disappear. Rather, we might expect to see an evolution of the movement as has occurred in Iran with some groups holding to militant position while other groups gain strength and confidence in asserting support for democratic principles within an Islamic framework. He views this differentiation as the emergence of a new kind of pluralism within the Muslim world that is itself affecting the nature of Muslim affairs.

Fuller urges policymakers to view political Islam as a vehicle for change rather than a cause of conflict. He argues that Westerners and Muslims alike need to recognize that conflicts frequently reflect genuine grievances that must be addressed in order for workable solutions to emerge. He argues that political Islam, as the preeminent force for change in the region, has the potential to play a positive role in the future development of the Muslim world. He asserts that international forces must take care not to hinder the emergence of Islamic liberalism by continuing to invest in authoritarian regimes offering short-term gains.

Noah Feldman has recently been named by the Bush Administration as Senior Advisor for Constitutional Law in Iraq at the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA). He is also an Assistant Professor at the New York University School of Law. He was a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University where he earned a Ph.D. in Islamic Studies. His recent book, After Jihad: America and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy (2003), articulates optimism regarding the possibility of democratization in the Muslim world.

Feldman observes that Islamists have generally shifted strategy by “moving beyond the fantasy of violent revolution and Islamic utopia” and turning toward “persuasion and pragmatism” (p. 6). He asserts that the ideals of self-governance and freedom associated with democracy have begun to resonate deeply with increasing numbers of Muslims. For these reasons, he strongly criticizes “absolutist thinking that insists on arraying movements like ‘democracy’ and ‘Islam’ against each other” (p. 10). He argues that even though a separation between religion and state is unlikely to occur in most Muslim societies in the foreseeable future, the United States should support efforts to find means of accommodation between Islam and democracy. He asserts that the incentives created by American foreign policy should be altered so that they begin to facilitate rather than discourage democratic developments in the Muslim world. Furthermore, he states, “Failure to engage the possibilities of Islamic democracy will have serious consequences for the long-term American interests and values, to say nothing of its grave consequences for the peoples of the Muslim world” (p. 13). He argues that “the betrayal of the values of freedom and self-government that the U.S. and the West represents”…will communicate to Muslims that “democracy is less an animating aspiration at the core of American values than a tool to be deployed cynically and selectively” (p. 14).

Feldman’s book is essentially an argument for shifting the current U.S. policy away from supporting authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world. He presents an argument for why the U.S. should help what he calls “Islamic democracy” to emerge. By exploring the theme, “what comes after jihad,” he endeavors to outline how democratization is possible within an Islamic context. He also claims to provide a “road map of constructive, practical steps to be taken to make Islamic democracy a reality” (p. 16).

Feldman does a fairly good job of arguing for Islamic democracy conceptually. Unfortunately, his chapter on “How to Do It” is just ten pages long. He emphasizes economic incentives and briefly describes how direct aid, human resource development, investment, the expansion of free trade agreements, and debt relief might help in various countries. He also mentions the need for legal reform and support for school infrastructure. However, few of his ideas on the specifics of democratization are explored in much depth. (See Boston Review website for a series of articles on Islam and democracy from the April/May 2003 issue: http://bostonreview.net/).

————————————————
June 4, 2003

Richard G. Kraince
.(JavaScript must be enabled to view this email address)