The image of veiled women have recently become highly visible in the national media in Indonesia, and even published as the headline pictures. While some of these women wear fashionable scarves and leave a bit of hair showing at the top, others cover not only their hairs completely but also their faces. Nevertheless, there is something in common between them: they are suspects of particular crimes. From Malinda Dee who is suspected for Citibank embezzlement and fraudulent case, Nunun Nurbaiti and Yulianis who are involved in high profile bribery case, to Afriani Susanti who is charged for drugs case that eventually led her taking nine lives away, all appears in different style of veil. Veiling in this context is seen by many as a mere attempt of covering their shame if not gaining public sympathy, as the suspects only wear it once they encounter legal troubles. This trend incites criticism of some Muslims who consider this conduct as a kind of religious offense. 
As a matter of fact, Islam did not invent or introduce the custom of veiling. Veiling is a pre-Islamic in origin; it had existed in the region prior to Islam – in Hellenic, Judaic, Byzantine, and Balkan cultures (El-Guindi, 1999). As an occasional custom, however, veil has not been institutionalized until Islam adopted it. Many Muslims associate veiling with women’s protection based on their interpretation of Qur’an surah al-Ahzab 59, wherein female believers should cover themselves so that “they will be recognized” as free women instead of slaves and therefore “not be abused”. In this regard, Fatima Mernissi (1985) explained that the medieval Muslim scholars like Imam al-Ghazali perceived female sexuality as both active and destructive, a perception which in the end underlies the idea of control over women’s bodies. For this reason, women are required to cover their bodies, to be secluded, and to be protected by male relative (mahram) in order to avoid sexual harassment and to prevent social disorder (fitna) within Muslim society. Absurdly, nothing is to be imposed on men in this matter. 

Furthermore, veil has played an important role in the construction of Muslim women’s identity as they encountered Western colonizers at the end of the nineteenth century. Leila Ahmed (2005) observed how the new discourses concerning the veil emerged in Egypt during the British colonial domination in a way that it became a powerful signifier not only for gender but also for nationalism and culture. At that time, the colonial narrative had associated veiling with the backwardness and inferiority of Islam, wherein unveiling is regarded by contrast as the sign for modernization and advancement. According to Ahmed, various meanings of veil at present are derived mainly from the three master-narratives that developed since the colonial era.

First, the colonial narratives that perceive veil as the symbol of inferiority of Islam vis-à-vis the superiority of Western moral order and civilization. Some elements of this narrative have been reiterated, for instance, when the burqa is used as moral justification for United States’ war in Afghanistan. Second, the westernized local elite’s narratives about veil as backward practice that must be abandoned to achieve women emancipation, which is deemed as the key for progress and modernity. The Turkish ban on headscarves in public institutions, for example, is part of its attempt to westernize and modernize the nation. Third, the Islamic counter narratives that affirm veiling as an essential part of Islamic dress, a way of embracing modernity and feminism within the framework of the divinely ordained order. This narrative is reflected, for instance, in the adoption of new style of veil by the Islamist movement in Egypt. Since the 1970s they introduced their innovative construction of Islamic dress (al-ziyyi al-Islamy), which in fact does not represent a return to any traditional dress, nor does it has any historical precedent.

Unsurprisingly, the veil becomes a major site of ideological struggle between the forces of traditionalism and modernity in Muslim countries, and a yardstick for measuring the emancipation or repression of Muslim women (Mir-Hosseini, 2007). In the case of Iran, the secular regime under Reza Shah enforced unveiling in their attempt to modernize the country and consequently punished anyone wearing veil in public. On the contrary, the Islamist regime afterward imposed veiling on its female citizens and punished whoever not wearing it in their assertion of what they regard as authentic religiosity. The meaning of veil becomes a subject of debate between the Islamists who perceive it as a divine mandate for protecting women’s honor and dignity, and the feminists who perceive veil as a patriarchal mandate for denying women’s right and autonomy over their own bodies.

An Iranian cleric Morteza Motahhari, among others, had shifted the spirit of women’s seclusion in the Islamic jurisprudence into the spirit of protection by arguing that the main purpose of veiling is not to exclude women from the society but to facilitate their participation and to protect them from being treated as sexual objects. Later on, an Iranian intellectual Ali Shari’ati turned the meaning of veil from a symbol of tradition into revolution, which endorsed women to wear it to show their confrontation toward the Shah’s regime. The same discourse inspired Indonesian Muslim women to veil in their opposition against Suharto’s authoritarian regime, who initially banned the headscarves in schools and government institutions. In this context, veil becomes a powerful symbol of resistance against dictatorship and repression.  Veiling also became a symbol of anti-colonial resistance during Algerian fight for independence in 1950s.

Nowadays, veiling may become an expression of one’s cultural identity, religious commitment, political statement, or taste of fashion. Veiling may also stands for one’s resistance against sexism, stereotype and prejudice within society. Some women wear it for functional reasons, for instance in order to avoid sexual harassment, to access particular employment/education or to save the cost of attire. Some others wear it as a resistance to the commodification of women’s bodies or to the hegemony of Western values. Many women simply wear it to preserve their female modesty and acquire religious piety. Thus, being pregnant with multiple meaning, veil cannot be arbitrarily assumed as a signifier of women oppression. Hanna Papanek (1982) even considered burqa as a liberating tool because it allows women to participate in public sphere while observing their moral stipulation of avoiding contact with strange men. As a social being, it is natural that humans are guided by socially shared standards, religious beliefs, and moral ideals in choosing what they wear.

Veiling can be a form of oppression if it is imposed by the authority, but it can be liberating if it is worn out of one’s personal choice and conscience. Compulsory veiling will only lead to a hypocrite religiosity, put the burden of social order unfairly on women’s shoulders, and divert people’s attention from the more important task of the state such as providing social justice and welfare. On the other hand, the ban of veiling will only confine women in their homes instead of endorsing them to participate in public activity and integrate within broader society. Worse still, the ban violates women’s rights to practice their religious teaching and limits their access to education and employment. Most importantly, women have to give the veil a new meaning continuously in accordance to the developing context. Mufti of Marseilles Soheib Benceikh for instance, asserted that the objective of veiling is to protect women, which has specific context in times of its revelation. If the prescribed means does not achieve the objectives, then Muslims have to seek for the new way. Today, he argued, the ‘veil’ for Muslim women is education that guarantees women’s future and preserve their dignity.

(Translated and Reviewed by: Natalia Laskowska)

Tolerance and religious freedom always rest upon the verse La Ikrāha fi al-Dīn. The God said precisely , “There is no compulsion in religion, for the right way is clearly from the wrong way. Whoever therefore rejects the forces of evil and believes in God, he has taken hold of a support most unfailing, which shall never give way, for God is All Hearing and Knowing (lā ikrāha fî al-dīn, qad tabayyana al-rusyd min al-ghayy, faman yakfur bit-tāghūti wa yu’umin billāhi faqadi astamsaka bil-‘urwati al-wuthqa lā anfisāma lahā wa allāhu samī‘un ‘alīm” (The Holy Qur’ān, al-Baqara, 2: 256).

Abu Muslim and al-Qaffal argue this verse emphasizes that faith is based on a conscious choice, not under pressure. In his book, Marah Labidz, Muhammad Nawawi al-Jawi asserts that the meaning of this verse makes coercion to embrace a religion unjustifiable. From grammatical point of view, Arabic word lā in this verse includes lā linafyi al-jins, meaning denial of all kinds of compulsion in religion. This verse also expresses lafẓ ‘amm (general word).

The meaning of lafẓ ‘amm in the Ḥanafī jurisprudence is qaṭ‘ī (definitive) so it is impossible that there would be takhṣīṣ (restriction in its understanding), let alone naskh (abrogation) with dalīl ẓannī (ambiguous argument).

This verse is a textual foundation of the Islamic view on religious freedom. Jawdat Sa’id in his book, titled La Ikrāha fi al-Dīn, observes that “lā ikrāha fī al-dīn qad tabayyana al-rushdu mina al-ghayy” is a universal verse (āyat kabīrat jiddān), especially as this verse is revealed precisely after one of the most important verses, the Throne Verse. If the Throne Verse contains the doctrine of the sanctity of God, the following verse respects the human by, among other, guaranteeing the right to religious freedom.

Interpreting this verse, Jawdat Sa’id asserts that ‘compulsion’ (al-ikrāh) is al-ghayyi, and that is the wrong way (al-ṭarīq al-khathī’). The ‘no compulsion’(allāikrāh) is al-rusyd and that is the right way (al-ṭarīq al-shahīh). The sense of this verse is “no compulsion in religion”. Indeed, the difference between non-compulsion and compulsion is already clear. Contrary to the majority of commentators, Jawdat Sa’id interprets the word ṭāghūt, farther in this verse, as a person who forces his thoughts and beliefs to others, and kills those whose beliefs are different than his own.

Jawdat Sa’id expresses his views on the verse. First: the verse provides a guarantee to others that they will not face coercion from anyone. This verse asserts that a person will not be forcedby anyone to anything, including religion. Second:the verse can be understood as a command (kalām insyāī) and as an informative sentence (kalām ikhbārī). As a command it orders one not to exercise compulsion towards other people. As an informative sentence, it tells that a person who is forced to embrace a religion while his heart rejects it, he or she cannot be said to have embraced that religion. This is because religion is in the steadiness of heart, not in an verbal expression. Third: this verse prohibits killing persons who change their religion, for this verse was revealed to prohibit the compulsion in the matter of religion.

Several scholars of tafsīr have mentioned a few narrations which are behind the revelation of this verse. Al-Qurthubi in al-Jami’ li Ahkam al-Qur’an gave following accounts to explain why the verse was revealed. First: Sulaiman ibn Musa claimed that this verse was abrogated by another verse which allows the Muslim community to kill members of other religious communities. He added that Prophet Muḥammad had forced and fought non-Muslims who lived in Arabia to make them embrace Islam. Farther, Ibn Katsīr quoted the views of a group of scholars who claimed that this verse was abrogated by the verses of war (ayat al-qital). According to this all mankind must be called upon to embrace Islam. If they do not want convert and do not want to pay the retribution (jizya) they must be fought. InTafsir al-Qur’an al-’Azhim, Ibn Katsīr said that the verse is a command that Muslims do not force others to embrace Islam. At the same time, forThabathaba’i in al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur’an, the verse cannot be abrogated without the abrogation of the legal cause behind it (‘illah al-hukm). That legal cause is explicit in the words which clearly differentiate between the right (al-rusyd) and the wrong (al-ghayy).

Second: the verse is not abrogated. Yet it was revealed particularly for the ahli kitāb. They cannot be forced to enter Islam as long as they pay retribution (jizya). This opinion is expressed by al-Sya`bi, Qatadah, al-Hasan, and al-Dhahhak. These scholars reinforce their argument with the narration of Zaid ibn Aslam from his father. He heard that ʿUmar ibn Khaṭṭāb was talking to an old Christian woman. “Old woman, embrace Islam, you shall be saved, for God sent the truth with Muḥammad”. The woman replied “I am old already, and soon death will come for me”. ‘Umar said, “Oh God, I bear witness for this woman”, then he read the verse.

Other opinions behind the revealing of the verse are as following. First, as told by Abu Dawud, al-Nasa’i, Ibn Hibban, Ibn Jarir from Ibn Abbas: Once there was a woman who had no children. She promised to herself that if she had a child, the child would become a Jew. She would not allow her child to embrace any other religion. With such setting the verse was revealed as a prohibition against compulsion in religion.

Second, the verse was revealed linking to an Anshari man, Abu Hushain. It was told that Abu Hushain was a Muslim man who had two Christian children. He complained to the Prophet and asked whether he could force his children to convert to Islam, though both of them were inclined to Christianity. He asked the Prophet if he would let them go to hell. After this incident, the word of God which forbids compulsion in matters of religion was revealed.

Knowing this sabab al-nuzūl, it is clear that compulsion in religion is not allowed. Ibrahim al-Hafnawi asserts that religious freedom is a fundamental principle of Islamic doctrine, so that there is no verse in the Qur’ān nor in the hadiths which contradicts this principle. A similar opinion is expressed by Rasyid Ridla inTafsir al-Qur’an al-Hakim. Since the foundation of religion is the faith, which essence lays in subordination of the self, then, according to Ridla, it cannot go along with compulsion. With this it can be said that faith is not a must or obligation to the extent that it must be forced from the outside. Faith is a choice, consciousness and a subjective subordination of human being to teachings of the God.

It is the right of every person to believe that his or her religion is true. However, at the same time he or she must also respect that others think so about their religions. Therefore, the matter of belief is a private issue (qadliyah syakhshiyyah) of every person, so that there cannot be compulsion. Jamal al-Banna in Hurriyah al-Fikr wa al-I’tiqad fi al-Islam notes that the Prophet was only a messenger. He had no authority to compel. God tells in the Qur’ān: “Therefore do thou give admonition, for thou art one to admonish. Thou art not one to manage (men’s) affairs.” (al-Ghāshiya 88: 21-22). In another verse the God says: “If it had been thy Lord’s will, they would all have believed,- all who are on earth! wilt thou then compel mankind, against their will, to believe!” (Yūnus 10: 99).

Abdul Karim Soroush makes such an illustration: as much as a person faces death on his own, on his own he embraces a religion. Indeed, each religious community undertakes communal rites and activities, but not a communal faith. If the expression of faith is public, the essence of faith is private and hidden. For Soroush, the territory of faith is like an arena of the hereafter where every human will be evaluated on his own. As said by God in the Qur’ān, “And everyone of them will come to Him singly on the Day of Judgment” (Maryam 19: 95).

There is not much use of forcing somebody to embrace a religion if it is not followed by his or her belief and conviction. Religion when forced, according to Jawdat Sa’id, is same as forced love. “With compulsion there is no religion, as much as with compulsion there is no love”. A true embracement of religion must be followed by a deep conviction for the teachings of that particular religion. Moreover, every person has the right to choose whether to believe or not to believe. The Prophet once offered one of his female slaves, Rayhanah binti Zaid, to convert to Islam. Yet Rayhanah preferred Judaism. The Prophet would not be angry with Rayhanah. And finally she herself decided to embrace Islam.This is an example. Even as a master, the Prophet would not force his slave to embrace religion which he follows himself.

The prohibition of compulsion in religion can be understood as God perceives a man as a sentient being. With his mind a human can choose the best religionfor himself. God spoke: “Say, the truth is from your Lord: Let him who will believe, and let him who will, reject it” (al-Kahfi 18: 29). This means a man does not have the authority to assess and to intervene into faith of another person. It is God that has the right to evaluate the authenticity of person’s faith. And this is done in the hereafter. God said: “Verily thy Lord will judge between them on the Day of Judgment, in the matters wherein they differ (among themselves)” (al-Sajda 32: 25). Since faith originates from the conviction that is engraved in one’s heart, only God knows the essence of it.To believe is a solitary act, faith is a part of a private commitment.

Borrowing here some terminology from the Islamic jurisprudence: the matter of faith is the right of God (ḥaqq Allāh). This means believing or not believing is and individual matter between a human being and his God, the God. The choice between belief and unbelief is a private issue. Every human has the right to believe and to disbelieve. For belief and unbelief do not belong to the responsibilities of man but of God. Responsibility lies in the hands of one who is relevant in that particular relationship with God. A person cannot be held responsible for the sins of other people. And vice versa. God spoke in al-Qur’ān “Say, ye shall not be questioned as to our sins, nor shall we be questioned as to what ye do” (Sabā’ 34: 25).

The followers of Gus Dur, the former Indonesia’s President Abdurrahman Wahid, who identify themselves as Gus-Durian has gathered in Jakarta about two weeks ago. No less than five dozen people came from different regions and generations. They held a symposium for three days (16-18 November 2011) to crystallize the ideas of Gus Dur in the context of Indonesia, Islam, and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). The organizer requested Gus Dur’s friends and colleagues to speak in that forum. As a santri or student of Gus Dur, I was also requested to speak about Gus Dur.

My knowledge of Gus Dur is probably not perfect. Many people know Gus Dur better than me because they specifically conduct the researches on Gus Dur’s thoughts and activities. Tens and even hundreds of books have been published on Gus Dur’s thoughts in detail, during his life as well as after his death. Gus Dur has been analyzed from various perspectives and disciplines. In that forum, I just reiterated the most important point in Gus Dur’s thoughts, namely his consistent rejection of Islamic “orthodoxy” and “purification”.

Gus Dur has functioned as a breaker of the frozen thoughts among Muslim society in general and members of Nahdlatul Ulama in particular. He did not close the door of philosophy in Islam. For that reason, he introduced philosophical discourses to the Muslim society in Indonesia. He did not only read the thoughts of al-Ghazali who refuse philosophy, but also swallowed the ideas of Ibn Rushd who accept philosophy. In fact, Gus Dur was enthusiastic in visiting the world of thinkers like al-Kindi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Thufail, ibn Bajah and the Greek philosophers like Aristotle and Plato. He also traveled quite far in reading the works of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Immanuel Kant and Bonaventure.

With sufficient basis of Islamic knowledge, Gus Dur carried out dynamization of Islamic thought. He also sharply criticized the stagnation of Islamic thought. Gus Dur viewed that ushul fiqh, which is historically a creative process to dynamize the Islamic jurisprudence, has developed into a very normative selection tools that castrates human’s creativity. As a result, Muslims turn to be narrow-minded and very exclusive. Muslims become a burden for the resurgence of Islamic civilization. The legal decision-making (istinbath) cannot take place anymore because the Muslim clerics have been trapped in the old formulation of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). They used to reject various attempts to rearrange the Islamic jurisprudence.

Although he is not widely known as an expert in fiqh, Gus Dur stepped in to restoring the stagnant Islamic Jurisprudence. He demanded reinterpretation of the religious text that seemed to clash the notions of human rights, pluralism and democratic values, such as reflected in the redefinition of the terms apostate (murtad) and unbeliever (kafir). Gus Dur fiercely debated Muslim groups who classify non-Muslims in Indonesia as kafir dhimmi who have inferior status than Muslims and even as kafir harbi whom they are allowed to fight. Gus Dur gave a new interpretation over the concept of al-maqasid al-syar’iyah or al- dlaruriyat al-khams (five basic principles of Islam), particularly that he interpreted the notion of hifdz al-din as the freedom of religion and the notion of hifdz al-aql as the freedom of thought.

Because he realized about the existence of relativism and subjectivism in fiqh, Gus Dur refused any attempt of adopting fiqh into the state’s positive law. Formalization of Islamic jurisprudence in the state’s legislation, according to Gus Dur, is not a solution for the plural Indonesian society. Gus Dur had been sounding the warning bells since a long time ago that someday Muslims would insist the formalization of this particular as well as diverse Islamic jurisprudence. Formalization of a certain school of fiqh means throwing dozens of other schools. That is why Gus Dur would rather submit fiqh in the hands of religious scholars instead of the state authorities. He let fiqh to be a field of intellectual exploration for the Muslim scholars instead of a hegemonizing tool for the state leaders.

According to Gus Dur, all citizens including Muslims must be encouraged to refer to Pancasila and the Constitution 1945 instead of the sacred texts. Despite these scriptures may become an inspiration, they should not become an aspiration. Gus Dur observed that the demand on formalization of Islamic law is sectarian in nature and incompatible with the principle of equality for all citizens. In Indonesia, a person’s primary position is as a citizen of the state and not as an adherent of any religion. All of us are the Indonesian citizens first, and then the adherents of religions (Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Sikhism, Baha’I and etcetera).

In my humble opinion, Gus Dur’s ideas are timeless and should be continually reverberated and circulated among Indonesian public. It is not that we are fanatical about Gus Dur, but because his universal ideas are beneficial for the plural society of Indonesia. It is hard to imagine that Indonesia will continue to exist if the ideas endorsed by Gus Dur, including the human rights, democracy and pluralism, are removed from Indonesian archipelago. []

From the medieval confrontation between Islam and Christianity to the present era of interreligious dialogue, question related to sexual morality, particularly that concerns issue of homosexuality has been an interesting challenge for many to understand. Cross-cultural reading of texts is one of many options by which we may regard it as a perspective to depart, we may pull the trigger by exposing some facts on how Islamic “death-penalty” for homosexuals—for instance—appears as allegedly clashed with the “Western” conceptions of basic human rights. Here we could recall—for instance—the controversial movie titled “Fitna” which was directed by Scarlet Pimpernel in 2008, in which Islam was harshly depicted as heart-less religion, even barbarian, especially for gay men who commit homosexual practices in Muslim countries like Iran.

Some Western gays assume that Islam is more accommodative to gay culture than Christian-Judaeo tradition. Homosexual sex-tourism to Muslim countries and the considerable number of gays who convert to Islam have played a significant role in making modern “Western sexuality” visible in the Islamic world (Duran, 1993: 186). As an impact, liberal-sexual morality of modern Western world is perceived by Muslims as an indication of the decadence of the West. As an example, many Islamists like Prof Dr. Malik Badri used the notion of “Western modernity” and “Western sexual revolution” as weak points by which he showed the superiority of Islam and its morality over Western civilization (The AIDS Crisis; 2000). Because of such tendency, movements of gay sexual rights that appear in the Islamic world have always been regarded negatively as symptoms of ‘Westernization’ or forms of Western cultural and ideological imposition.

Regardless of the assumption of Islam being too much denial or more accepting to homosexuals compared to Christianity, this writing is not intended to discuss religion and sexuality in such a normative way. It is not about to create a new theology, but rather to obtain a close-comprehensive understanding on the discourse of homosexuality based on Quranic and Biblical reading, particularly on verses that are closely related to the issue.

This is more about an invitation to cross the two traditions in order to review the existing theological construction of homosexuality, in order to argue that the texts would never construct homosexuality discourse by itself, but rather to highlight some sociological and anthropological facts showing that the disapproval of both religions to homosexuality was socially and culturally constructed, particularly during the process of the dissemination of Tafseer and exegetical activities. The process of “othering” homosexuals certainly involves a particular setting in which social norms and cultural categories were taking place.

Homosexuality in Christianity
It is somehow surprising me that it was easier for me to find references on “Christianity and homosexuality” than on “Islam and homosexuality”. I am not quite sure whether this preliminary note can be considered as the hypothetical departure that Christianity (which many people uncritically regarded as The West) is more open to the issue of homosexuality compared to Islam.

During my short random research for books, I have found at least two similar books on “homosexuality and the Bible”. The first book is written by Donald J. Wold under the title Out of Order; Homosexuality in the Bible and the Ancient Near East (1998). And the other book is written by Daniel A. Helminiak under the title What the Bible Really Says about Homosexuality (2000).

While Donald in his book tried to provide analytical reading to the discourse of homosexuality in the ancient Near East, Old Testament and New Testament, Helminiak on the other hand proposed an alternative reading to the Bible which is supposedly representing the “liberal-progressive” interpretation to the Bible, particularly in regard to the discourse of homosexuality.

From these two books I found that in Christianity, “homosexuality discourse” is often referred to the text of old testament, especially Genesis 9:18-27 which is about the story of Noah and his children, Genesis 19: 1-11 on Sodom and Gomorra, Leviticus 18:22, and Leviticus 20:13 on law on male-male sex. While in the New Testament, we will find only few verses which explicitly (literally) denote the notion of homosexuality. The clearest one is Roman 1:18-32.
It might be important also to mention that there are other biblical texts which are indirectly related to the issue of homosexuality. Some of them are Judges 19 (Story of Levite) & Ezekiel 16:48-49 (Sodom), Isaiah 1:10-17, Jeremiah 23:14, Zephaniah 2:8-11 (all about Sodom and Gomorra), Matthew 5:17-19 (New Testament as the continuation of Old Testament’s law, including law on homosexuality), and Matthew 10:5-15 (hospitality and Sodom-Gomorrah).

All these biblical texts are perceived and understood literally by the traditional-literal readers of the Bible—especially from the rabbinic interpretations—as the condemnation towards homosexuality in Christianity. These particular texts and their interpretations are usually understood by Christians to denounce homosexuals.

However, there are efforts from Biblical scholars to re-think about these texts using historical-critical approaches to these texts. These efforts showed that actually the process of “othering” homosexual happened during the interpretation activity itself. Because actually, these texts in particular never stated clearly about “homosexual-other” but rather imply about many other issues. Secondly these texts were born not in a social vacuum, but they emerged in a specific context, in which the homosexual othering was already constructed.

Both books which I have mentioned before started with the same consideration that “sexuality” is—indeed—a new discourse. We cannot expect from the Bible to say about “homosexuality” as the term that confirm the word “homosexuality” as we understand it today. In fact, homosexuality in today discourse is not merely about same-sex sexual “activities”.

It is also about a particular way of being human; about spontaneous affection for people of the same sex; about ethical possibility for expressing that affection in sexual relationships etc. Homosexuality today is a core aspect of the personality, which probably fixed by early childhood, biologically based, and affecting a significant proportion of the population in virtually known culture (Helminiak, 2000: 40)

So what do those texts mean historically?

Helminiak’s historical reading on Sodom and Gomorra especially Genesis 19: 1-11 suggests that the story shouldn’t be understood literally as condemnation of homosexuality (Helminiak, 2000), because in fact, there is no clear evidence that the verse is directed to be a proposition to condemn homosexuality. There are other ‘criminal-ethical’ issues which supposed to be the “actual” concerns of the story of Sodom and Gomorra. Historical-critical reading to the Bible suggests that at the time of this mythical story was “created”, sex was merely incidental. The actual sin was bitter hatred of strangers (Helminiak, 2000: 43-50). That’s why we found in the text that the strongest moral issue of this mythical story is about hospitality and inhospitality (Wold, 1998: 77).

The story of Sodom and Gomorra is not about sexual ethics, since the context of these texts doesn’t recognize “sexuality” as being “hetero” or “homo” as today’s “Western classification”. Sodom and Gomorrah is not about male-male sex, but rather male-male rape, it was not even about homogenitality but hard hatredness and abusing visitors. From the story and its context, forcing sex on man was a way for humiliating them. Sodomy was a way to insult men by treating them like women. The practice of Sodomy even imply about superiority of the one who penetrates and the inferiority of the other receptive sexual partner (Helminiak 2000: 43-50, Wold, 1998: 77).

If the story of Sodom and Gomorrah never state clearly about prohibition of homosexual activity like we understand it in today term, the prohibition of male-male sex occured only in the “holiness code” of Leviticus, and nowhere else (Helminiak, 2000: 53-54). However, Helminiak said that the abomination to male-male sex was merely about “Homogenital acts” not “homosexuality” as the term understood today. In fact, Homogenital act was prohibited by Jewish leaders to be practiced in Jewish community, because Homogenital act is “Gentile activities”. The prohibition of Homogenital act was a process of maintaining tradition; cultural identity of the Jews etc. (Helminiak, 2000: 53-61).

As we all have known, Israel has to be “Holy” (different from Gentile [Egypt and Canaan]). Israel was God’s Chosen People (Leviticus: 18) which supposed not to behave like others, even sexually. In fact, Homogenital act was one of Canaan’s traditions. Some of other traditions of Canaan was “fertility rites” that family might have sex one another; having sex with menstruating woman; child sacrifice etc. all of these practices were banned by Jewish tradition and the prohibition called “The Holiness Code”. That’s why the holiness code called these rituals as “Abomination” (Leviticus 18:22)

We see that “Holiness code” of Leviticus prohibits male same sex acts for religious reasons (identity-other) not merely for sexual reasons. It was neither ethical nor moral, because the prohibition was intended to keep Israel distinct from the Gentile (Ummiyyin). So, Homogenital sex is forbidden because it was associated with Gentile identity. No thought is given to whether the sex itself is right or wrong, the intent is to keep Jewish identity strong. However, we should be aware that this interpretation belongs to the Jewish view toward “others” (Canaan). The case might be different if we reverse the direction to consider what would be the view of Canaan toward Jews? Who are here the “colonials” who live as the center, and who are the “peripheries” who live at the margin, especially in this accusation?

As the old testaments contain texts on homosexuality and their interpretation in a cultural context, we may find also texts from the New Testament, for instance Roman 1: 18-28 which is also talking about a cultural issue. Helminiak said that only in the verse 27 that he found a clear reference to Homogenital acts in which he elaborated the word of Paul “unnatural intercourse”, “degrading” and “shameless act” etc. (Helminiak, 2000: 75-86)

Homosexuality in Islam

If we have found biblical texts which supposedly to be the references to ban homosexuality, there are—at least—seven places in the Qur’an in which Muslim considered them as the verses condemning homosexuality. They are QS: 7:80-84, 11:77-83, 21:74-75, 22:42-44, 26:165-175, 27: 54-59, 29: 27-33. But, all of these verses are about the story of Prophet Lot and Sodom. In fact, it is important to say that we couldn’t find any Qur’anic reference to homosexuality except that is derived from the story of Sodom. However, unlike in Christianity, homosexuality messages in the Qur’anic version of Loth and his community is more explicit than in Christianity.

Beside those texts of al-Quran, Muslim considers also Hadith as the second textual basis for their belief. One of those Hadith texts which signify about “homosexuality” telss us that the Prophet Muhammad PBUH said that “If two men commit unchastity with each other, then punish them both” (quoted by Jim Wafer, 2000). Another Hadith which recommends to stone Muslims who practice sodomy said “kill both the homosexual active partner (al-Fa’il), and the passive one (al-Maf’ul)”.

Muslim traditional interpreters of al-Quran such as Ibn Kathir, al-Qurthuby and al-Alushy tend to use “inter-textual” approach (Tafsir al-Ayah bi al-Ayah [or] bil-Hadits) to explain these texts. Al-Alushy—especially—is very visible in using this inter-textual approach, since He is very supportive to the idea of correlative inter-textuality (Munasabat/ Tanasub) as many of rabbinic interpretation models of the Bible. Ibn Kathir is also close to this approach when he elaborates more on Hadith and traditional narratives (Riwayat / Akhbar) to explain Quranic verses, while al-Qurthuby is more attentive to the aspect of Fiqh (Islamic Jurisprudence) and moral messages of the Quran.  However, all of them consider those verses mentioned above as the explicit condemnation toward homosexuality.

Indeed, traditional Tafsir never distinguish between homosexuality and homogenitality. They do not recognize terms such as homoeroticsm, sexual behavior and sexual orientation etc. But the classical Islamic tradition simply says that Islam doesn’t support any practice of “homosexuality” of no matter what.

If we search more carefully to the issue of homosexuality in Islam, especially in the literature of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh), many of Muslim scholars tend to not further elaborate in the discourse. Some others even tend to be ignorant toward the issue, while indeed there are few Muslim scholars who have concern to talk about “homosexuality” in terms of its “Islamic punishment”.

However, it seems that Muslims do not have a single word regarding the punishment for homosexual people. There has been diversity about prophets’ opinion on the matter since sex between males was treated differently by the various legal schools in Islam. Hanafite School said that man to man sexual practice does not merit any physical punishment, while Hambalite School said that sex between males must be punished severely with stoning (rajm). According to Hambalite School, this punishment is referred to the Quranic narratives that Sodomites were punished by God with the “rain of stone”. It is narrated also that Abu Bakar (the first great successor of Muhammad) supposed to have had a Luthi (who practice sodomy) burned alive. Another Muhammad’s companion, Ibn Abbas stated that “sodomite should be thrown from the highest building in the town and then stoned” (Bell, 1979: 31).

As I have said beforehand that it is rather difficult to find a literature on Islam and homosexuality especially if we look for an “alternative” reading to the verses of homosexuality. Indeed, there are only few persons—if I cannot say “no body” at all— who dare to approach homosexuality in Islam through textual analysis (interpretation). In fact, Muslims still consider homosexuality as a marginal discourse, if not an embarrassing and distasteful subject of study, Western scholars of Islam and the Middle East have either ignored it altogether, treated it in occasional footnotes or, at worst, misrepresented and judged it on the basis of their personal moral convictions (Schmidtke, 1999: 261)

Nevertheless there are some references which are approaching the issue of homosexuality in Islam more culturally. We found as pioneer Abdul Wahhab Bouhdiba with his book Sexuality in Islam (1975). Subsequently we found Bruce W. Dunne’s with his book Outline of an agenda for historical research on homo- sexuality in the Middle East (1990), which followed by Sexuality and eroticism among males in Moslem societies, a collection edited by Arno Schmitt and Jehodea Sofer (1992) and Bio-bibliography of male-male sexuality and eroticism in Muslim societies (1995) These books consisted primarily of personal accounts by Western travellers of their disappointing sexual encounters with Arabs and Iranians. Another essay which is very important is written by Khalid Duran “Homosexuality in Islam”, in a book edited by Arlene Swidler Homosexuality and world religions (1993), also the other current book which concerns about homosexuality in Islam is edited by Stephen 0. Murray and Will Roscoe: Islamic homosexualities: culture, history, and literature (1997). The most recent book published by Muslim scholar on homosexuality in Islam is written by Scott Kugle under the title “Homosexuality in Islam: Islamic Reflection on Gay, Lesbian, and Transgender Muslims”(2010)

Although we cannot find “liberal-progressive” interpretation of Quranic texts on homosexuality as enough to counter the traditional interpretations of homosexuality in Islamic texts, these books are—indeed—very helpful to give us an understanding how Islamic interpretation in othering homosexuals is also constructed. Some evaluations of these books especially Murray’s editorial viewpoint suggests that Quranic texs are ambigous and not clear enough about condemning homosexuality (Wafer, 1997: 88); those texts are inconsistent (Wafer, 1997: 89) and their authenticity—of Hadits (sihhat alHadits)—is difficult to ascertain.

I personaly tend to understand Islam as the continuation of Judeao-Christianity traditions which are very strict in condemning homosexuality. Therefore we cannot explain about Islamic homosexuality unless we also explain beforehand about Judeao-Christianity traditions in that matter. The “macrocosmic” understanding of “Islam” will give us no choice but I believe that it could be somehow further exploration on the issue, so “Islam and homosexuality” would not be understood as a monolithic interpretation. Khalid Duran for instance, has the same problem to find about “alternative interpretations” for homosexual people. He can only suggest that we need some form of theological accommodation with Islam based on the development of new Shari’a (Duran, 1993: 181-195)

However through the lines left below I will provide some reasons why the discourse of homosexuality is very taboo to be shared in Muslim societies. That’s because first of all, Muslim culture tends to prefer not to speak about this issue. They maintain a conspiracy of silence about the issue (Wafer, 2000: 93) and “The will not to know” (Murray, 1997: 14-54). This doesn’t mean that there is no homosexual practice in Muslim societies, but Muslims simply do not want to speak about it. This evaluation also explains why homosexuality as “a deed”; a “practiced behavior” is there, but homosexuality as “a being” or an “identity” is not well recognized in Arab society until today. In fact, Arab and Muslim cultures remain to oppose any effort for homosexual identity and gay rights.

The second reason why homosexuality issue remains abstract in Muslim society, especially Arab culture is that because there is a concept of Moslem male-masculinity (Rujulah). If we understand homosexuality today as egalitarian-sexual practice between two males, it would be difficult to accept since there is a concept of masculinity in Arab-Muslim culture. As Murray has suggested in his article,
…today “Homosexuality” that include age-stratified, gender stratified and egalitariansame sex behavior is an etic not an emic classification (Murray, 1997: 41).

Arab culture still understands homosexual activity has to be done between the active (al-Fail) and the passive (al-Maf’ul); “the powerful” and “the opressed”; the one taking pleasure and the one who submits; Rajul (Masculin man) and Untsa (Woman or Effiminate one). There will never be “egalitarian homosexuals” in Arab’s mind.

In the analysis of Jim Wafer on symbolic organization in Arab culture, “sword” and “penis” are representing each other. Both are initiatory symbolism of Power. “Islam is warrior religion” (Jim Wafer, 2000: 91). Therefore, in the context of homosexuality, the power has to be done in the sense of power and control. It is not simply as a mutual relationship between two males, but homosexuality is about a construction of the powerful man and the oppressed one.

There was also a story of Abu Nuwwas, the great Arabic poet, who said that he slept with Christian, Jewish and Zoroastrian boys because he regarded it as the duty of every Muslim to sleep with them”. Abu Nuwwas does not specify why he regarded this as a duty, but it seems fairly clear that it was because he was making non Muslim boys submit to Muslim (Wafer, 2000: 94)

Wafer also elaborate that in fact,
“…The West is regarded as “decadent” by Muslims not just because it is becoming more accepting to homosexuality… but because, according to the initiatory symbolism of Islam, it has to be seen as effiminate (Jim Wafer, 2000: 93)
Based on this, I personally see about the same symptom of cultural clash and competition. For me the context of homosexual rejection and condemnation is the same between the contestation of “Arab male identity (rujulah) vs. “Western effiminism” and the cultural contestation between “Jewish Identity vs. Gentile sexual practice and rituals”

As another consideration, Jim Wafer could be true in his symbolic analysis since there is no discourse on Eunuch (inverts) and gender-variant (the third gender [Murray; 41]) in Quranic text, while there is verse in Matthew 19: 10 on eunuch. If we look at this comparison more carefully we may assume that unlike in Quranic text, egalitarian homosexuality might be provided in the Biblical texts. Homosexuality is indeed more “welcome” to be discussed in Western-Christian tradition than in Islam.

In fact, it is interesting to discuss further when we read Matthew 19: 3-10. There is exception for eunuch to use different law because they are different (not male-not female) although these verses also mention that God created human beings only as male and female

“Have you not read that the on who made them from the beginning male and female” (Matthew 19:4) then “Not anyone can accept this teaching, but only those to whom is given (Matthew 19:11-12)

I want to note that even though there is no Quranic text on eunuch, there is still a Hadith on Hayts (inverts) narrated by imam Muslim in the chapter al-Salam (4049), which may provide a space for discussion on egalitarian homosexuals in Islam. Although it was narrated in a Hadith that the prophet did not want the eunuch to be in his house, it is enough to indicate that the eunuch or Hayts (inverts) were common in the prophet’s own tribe (Quraish). In fact other riwayat said, that the prophet is also reported to have permitted inverst to be in the same room as his wives when they were not veiled (Wafer, 2000: 89)

The Story of Adam and Eve and the Story of Sodom and Gomorrah; the Basis for Religious-Sexuality Construction (Homosexuality vs. Heterosexuality)

Before I end up with a conclusion I should say that in the cross reading and comparison of the two textual traditions, the story of Adam and Eve and the story of Sodom and Gomorrah are the two bases for religious-sexuality construction, which are shared by the two traditions. If we cross the two traditions and use inter-texual approach, these texts can be viewed as each completes each other in constructing sexuality cosmos for both religions. However we should carefully consider that the Genesis and al-Quran are not a lesson on sexual orientation on heterosexuality versus homosexuality.

Especially in al-Quran, Adam and Eve” is a story of a cosmology in terms of God’s creation of male and female Min dzakarin wa Untsa (SEX), which is merely physical. However I have mentioned about the fact that al-Quran never said about eunuch; al-Quran doesn’t say about hermaphrodite (a person with double genitals/ trans-sex), although this is also physical. In this case, we may question about another model of creation which is not mentioned by al-Quran. In addition, we should also consider that the story of Adam and Eve doesn’t say about sexual orientation, rather to say about sexual reproduction!

For the textual analysis on progressive-liberal interpretation of homosexuality in Islam, Muslims may consider also verses on Wildanun Mukhalladun; “immortal male-youths” who serve as cup bearers in the heaven (jannah), as the paradise is not only furnished with female attendants (Huury/bidadari) but is also furnished with male youths.
Conclusion

As this article is trying to compare between Christian text and Islamic text on homosexuality, I believe that this way of comparison can be seen as a model of confirmative reading on the issue based on crossing two traditions for understanding certain issue.

It might not be legitimate to claim about “black and white” similarity or dissimilarity between Islam and Christianity in regard to homosexuality discourse. However this analysis tries to open possibility for cross-religious and cultural studies. In fact, since there is no evidence that homosexuality is pathological or disease, and there is no convincing evidence that sexual orientation can be changed, it is always interesting to challenge both Islam and Christianity to re-think about the issue of homosexuality from their theological understanding, basically from reading the texts.

If a cultural study on Islamic homosexuality in Islam specifically suggests a hypothesis that the classification is not between Homosexuals and Heterosexuals, but rather about who takes pleasure and who submit (Murray, 2000: 41), we should be aware that the Quran (or the Bible) never concerned homosexuality as the term is today being understood. In fact, the texts were revealed in a certain context, in which Israelite society and Arab people at the time of revelation never think about sexuality as the meaning of the term is expanded as today. Therefore, to put the issue as a challenge for modernity toward religions will always be justifiable. I should therefore agree with Duran who said that it is ironic that some Muslims consider the issue of homosexuality as rigid and unchangeable holy norm. In fact, this kind of thought is a stagnancy of Shari’a of the seventh and eighth century (Duran 1993: 186).

References:
- Badri, Malik. 2000. The AIDS Crisis: A Natural Product of Modernity’s Sexual Revolution. Kuala Lumpur: Meedena Books
- Bell, Joseph Norment. 1997. Love Theory in Later Hanbalite Islam. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press
- Duran, Khalid. 1993. ‘Homosexuality in Islam’, in Arlene Swidler (ed.), Homosexuality and world religions. Valley Forge, Penn: Trinity Press International, (pp. 181-197)
- Forth, Christopher E. 1996. “Intellectual Anarchy and Imaginary Otherness: Gender, Class, and Pathology in French Intellectual Discourse, 1890-1900”, the Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4, (autumn), Blackwell Publishing, pp. 645-671
- Helminiak, Daniel A., PhD. 2000. What the Bible Really Says About Homosexuality. New Mexico: Alamo Square Press.
- Murray, O. Stephen. 1997. Islamic Homosexualities; Culture, History and Literature. NY: New York University Press
- Nadia Zunly, 2005. Waria laknat atau Kodrat, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Marwa. O’Day Gail & David Peterson. The Access Bible. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidtke, Sabine. 1999. “Homoeroticism and Homosexuality in Islam: A Review Article” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies. London: University of London, Vol. 62, No. 2, pp. 260-266, Cambridge University Press
- Scott, Joan Wallach. 1990. Gender and the Politics of History. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Wafer, Jim. 1997 “Muhammad and Male Homosexuality”, ed. Murray, Islamic Homosexualities; Culture, History and Literature. NY: New York University Press (p.p 87-96)
- Wold, Donald. J. 1998. Out of Order; Homosexuality in the Bible and the Ancient near East. USA: Baker Books.

Feminism in Islam has become the subject of debate as well as the field of ignorance both within and outside Muslim societies. On the one hand, most of the Western media assume that feminism and Islam is an oxymoron as they blame Islam as the major raison d’être behind Muslim and Middle Eastern women’s plight. Indeed, Bush’s administration used the salvation rhetoric in order to justify the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that is claimed to save and liberate Afghani women from the Taliban’s grip. On the other hand, many Muslims discredit Islamic feminism as they deem it as another form of Western assault upon their cultural and religious tradition, and therefore consider Islamic feminists as traitors.

The debate between the secular and religious women groups heightened the controversy around Islamic feminism in the Islamic Republic of Iran, which has undergone a radical shift from a secular monarchy toward a Shia Islamic theocracy. Since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran established the rule of a clerical caste (velayat-e faghih) whose authority over social-political-religious system is absolute, wherein they enforced a kind of fundamentalist Islamism in both ideational and behavioral level. This is the reason why an extreme polarization occurs among Iranian scholars and activists in terms of their methodology and strategy for achieving gender equality and justice in the context of Islamic Republic.

One of the Iranian prominent scholars of Islamic feminism is Ziba Mir-Hosseini. She viewed that in addition to the monolithic interpretation of Islam, the conflation between sharia (the sacred and immutable divine will) and fiqh (the jurisprudence extracted from the Islamic sources by human), also becomes the source of tension between the egalitarian vision of Islam and the patriarchal context of Islam’s revelation. Far from being realizing justice, the implementation of the so-called sharia in Iran only revolves around the application of gender-biased policies on the criminal and family laws as well as the dress codes.

In this regard, Mir-Hosseini argued that the new approach that is feminist in its aspiration and demand and yet Islamic in its language and sources of legitimacy, will develop a gender discourse that meets women’s aspiration for equality. Due to the current reality that the Islamists hold the power in defining and exercising the political and gender discourse in Iran, only those who are prepared to engage with Islam’s sacred texts and its legal tradition can bring change from within (Mir-Hosseini, 2006: 644). Beside the Islamic scholarship, nevertheless, it must be noted that the Islamic feminists also necessitate socio-cultural analytical tools in order to formulate their reformist gender discourse.

In the meantime, an Iranian expert of women and gender studies Shahrzad Mojab, viewed Islamic feminism is counterproductive because it justified the traditional patriarchal system and unequal gender relation reinforced by the Islamist authority. Even if the feminist interpretation of religious texts were allowed to reform the legislations, she argued, it would require either the radical revision or discarding its theological basis, which none of the two parties would consent (Mojab, 2001: 136).  She further criticized the Islamic feminists’ reluctance to move into democratization of gender relation based on total separation of state and religion.

Although her criticism is somewhat true, one must remember that the process of democratization opens the space for dissent, thus the Islamist voice must also be included in the democratic social-political consideration. Furthermore, while secularism is theoretically an ideal system that will ensure equality regardless of gender and religious affiliation, in practice, it might be hostile toward the rights of women in observing their faith and pursuing education such as in Turkey wherein the veiling -out of women’s personal choice- denied them education.

As a matter of fact, these two opposing factions argue for the possibility and impossibility of improving women’s status within the Islamic framework. The Islamic feminists attempted to challenge the misogynist Islamic doctrines that underlie discriminatory discourses and policies through feministic ijtihad (independent reasoning) and women-friendly religious interpretation, which has led to significant changes in women’s rights. Meanwhile, the secular feminists viewed the former as apologists of the Islamic authority whose ‘exaggerated’ legal gains have diverted public attention from the destructive effect of Islamization and impeded the effort of secularization. In other words, the former seek for a gradual gender transformation by working and strategizing within the system that marginalized them, while the latter seek for a radical transformation by totally replacing the discriminative religious authority and legislation with the secular ones.

Another Iranian feminist scholar Valentine Moghadam, viewed that the critics of Islamic feminism are essentially denied women’s agency since they underestimated the Islamic feminists’ effort and achievement under the restrictive regime. In this regard, they perceived feminism merely as the privilege of the West by rejecting the idea of an emerging global feminism (Moghadam, 2002: 1154). To support her argument, Moghadam highlighted the importance of Islamic feminists’ publications in expanding gender consciousness among public and the effectiveness of their pressure in pursuing pro women legislations in terms of occupation, education, marriage, divorce and custody. The reality that most of Islamic feminists combined their religious interpretation with recognition of universal standards such as CEDAW (the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women), in fact, indicated their focus expansion from a mere theological argument to the socioeconomic and political issues. However, major change will not be resulted from the Islamic reform project alone as it necessitates the contribution of nonreligious scholars and activists as well. 

Ideally speaking, secularism that requires the state to protect the rights of all citizens irrespective of gender, religion, ethnicity and class is the best system to guarantee equality and justice in any country. However, given the current socio-religious-political realities of the contemporary Muslim world, Islamic feminism can be considered as the most feasible and realistic approach for gender reform. Not only that it serves as a strategic method to acquire religious legitimacy vis-à-vis the Islamist decision makers, it also minimizes public resistance and broaden the support base for women’s rights among Muslim societies.

In addition, the contradiction in terms of the Islamic feminism will not appear if we perceive feminism as both perspective and practice that counters social and gender inequalities, since that is also what the Islamic feminism all about. As Miriam Cooke put it, feminism identifies moment of awareness that something is wrong in the expectations for women’s treatment, of rejection of such expectation, and of activism to affect some kind of change (Cooke, 2000: 92).

The Islamic feminists do not only criticized discriminative discourses and practices imposed on women in the name of Islam, but they also formulated various measures to reform them by using the same idiom and framework. The voice of the Islamic feminism may threaten the dominant discourse of the Islamic regime, as they use their Islamic representations strategically against those who have ascribed them. In such way, they can challenge and deconstruct misogynist interpretation of the authoritative text while defending their religious and national communities, and thus undermining accusations of cultural betrayal. In Iran case, the Islamic feminism serves as a moderate alternative to the current Islamist regime’s gender politics as well as to the previous secular regime’s gender initiatives that has been met with fierce ideological and physical resistance.

As the largest Muslim populated country, albeit secular, Indonesia also faces a great challenge from the growing religious conservatism. Political reform that brings democracy and freedom to this country has been accompanied with the demand of Islamic formalization, in which sharia-inspired regulation that tend to discriminate women are proposed both in the national and local parliament. This reality brings the secular and Islamic feminists together in criticizing and monitoring these problematic legislations. Sometimes they win, as they successfully pushed the birth of the law against domestic violence that criminalizes the perpetrator of physical and psychological abuse in the household. Sometimes they lose, as they could not abort the anti pornography bill that tend to criminalizes women’s sexuality and behavior. Nevertheless, such collaboration proves that there can be different ways to achieve equality and justice, which must be considered as complementary instead of contradictory strategies for gender reform.

REFERENCES
Cooke, Miriam (2000) “Multiple Critiques: Islamic Feminist Rhetorical Strategies” in: “Nepantla: Views from South” Volume 1, number 1, pp.91-110, 2000,
Moghadam, Valentine. (2002) “Islamic Feminism and Its Discontents: Toward a Resolution of the Debate” in Signs, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 1135-1171
Mojab, Shahrzad. (2001) “Theorizing the Politics of Islamic Feminism”, in: Feminist Review, n.69. pp.124 146
Mir-Hosseini, Ziba. (2006) “Muslim Women’s Quest for Equality: Between Islamic Law and Feminism”. Critical Inquiry, Vol. 32, pp. 629-646

“Do you believe in God?”

It happened only once that this question came from my mouth, yet still the mere thought of uttering it makes me feel quite uncomfortable. “Do you believe in God?”. The person who had to hear it from me is one of the dearest beings that live on this planet, so back then I was just very gently made aware that the question was wrong. It is the last week that I sensed on my skin not only how wrong but also how intellectually boorish it was.

During somemore academic session on religion, one lady asked me “So do you really believe in God?”.I was baffled. Feeling uncomfortable to hear such question from a person whom I never met before, I changed the subject. But she came back with it requesting an answer with flat yes or no. I replied with question: “Do you have orgasm?”.

It was impolite, yet the two questions had something in common – answering them was disturbing, and both related to experience which only the person asked would know if it is there or not. And even supposing it is there one cannot be really certain it is.

Mark Johnston in Saving God (2009) makes a distinction between God and what one sees deep inside his heart and knows there is a god. Indeed, it would be difficult to know that our god is really God. Professor Johnston points three conditions we can determine by looking into our hearts: that we believe there is God; that we believe our god is God; and that we believe in our god. Yet do we actually believe in God then? We believe that we believe…This is already most personal and intimate.

We can see a difference between asking whether God exists or not, and whether a person believes in God or not. The latter one is like forcing somebody into our own patterns of believing: if we believe – into how we believe, if we do not believe – into how we think other people believe. And this is quite low, for somehow our concepts may be too shallow and conventional to fit other person’s subtle thought. Saying “yes” the person would accept the frame structured in our possibly very much limited brains. But maybe he or she would not really want to be reduced to it?

This is where answering “yes” becomes so odd and disturbing, it could be that the person would say “yes” to what is inside his heart, but he does not feel like saying “yes” to what is inside our hearts or brains. Saying “no” is equally uncomfortable. It could mean that the person clearly refuses to accept our idea of god which is already included in “Do you believe in God?” question. And this means the end ofdiscussion as well.

*The author is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland

Islam is a religion that brings developments. The developments occur through human’s reason that is definitely blessed with the ability to keep moving and growing dynamically. Islam is not a static religion which constantly gives a place for stagnation. For Neng Dara Affiah, this is the spirit transmitted by the book titled ‘Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam Indonesia’ (Renewal of Indonesian Islamic Thought). Neng Dara conveyed this in the book launching of ‘Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam Indonesia’ in November 28, 2011, in the Hall of Islamic State University (UIN) Graduate School, Maulana Malik Ibrahim, Malang. This book contents of 19 writings of several Indonesian Muslim intellectuals, among them Neng Dara Affiah and Ulil Abshar Abdalla who became the speakers as well as Syamsul Arifin who became the moderator in this book launching.

The book launching is a part of “road show” organized by Komunitas Epistemik Muslim Indonesia (Community of Indonesian Muslim Epistemic KEMI) - a group of Muslim intellectuals who make efforts to produce thinkers as well as their Islamic thoughts. “Road show” conducted in four cities in Indonesia (Padang, Malang, Makassar and Jakarta) is expected to introduce Islamic thoughts as described in the launched book. This ‘roadshow’ was able to open a more lively and productive discussion.

Neng Dara convinced with an optimistic view that Islam is very possible to bring developments along with human dynamics. On this occasion, Neng Dara tried to trace some prerequisites of developments of Islam in facing current challenges. Firstly, Islam strongly gives a priority to human’s potency of development. If it is analogized, human being is like a tree with strong roots, sturdy trunk and lush leaves. Humans will always experience the development of thinking during their life time. Secondly, Islam believes in maintaining women’s rights since women’s issue is not a marginal issue, but a central issue which is as important as other humanity issues. Thirdly, Islam is compatible with democracy as a good state system. The impression of democracy in our country is so bad, but it should not be a reason to be despair because the values of democracy are needed to create a just society system. Fourthly, Islam is very friendly to rights of minorities. Minority here could be anyone and anything, religious people, beliefs, etc which are potential for discriminated. Fifthly, Islam believes in the freedom of thought. When intellectual imagination is not interfered, it will produce unlimited thoughts.

In the discussion which was greatly welcome by most elements of the campus, Neng Dara, who is much involved in women’s issues in her activities for long time, believes that Islam is a religion which believes in maintaining the rights of women. It is mistaken if religion is used as a legitimacy of marginalizing women’s rights. On the occasion, Neng Dara also stated her anxiety about regional law regulations that has been increasingly developed, even 207 Shariah law have been found – based on the record of National Commission of Women’s monitoring—and all of them have a tendency to discriminate against women’s rights.

“The tendency can be called as a syndrome which considers woman’s aurat (a part of body which must be closed) as a scary thing. Therefore, women must be arranged in order not to threaten the stability of society. In fact, in the record of history, there is no precedent or example in the past about the state regulated the way women dressed. Certainly, we must agree that it is their own body, and should not be a part of the state affairs,” Neng Dara gave an emphasis.

Neng Dara Affiah, who has been the Commissioner of the National Commission for Women for two periods and also actively involved in the NU Fatayat, invited the participants to recall the history when women’s movements grew in the early 1920s, pioneered by Mardika Poetri movement in 1912. At that time, she said, women’s movements as well as other movements strongly controlled over colonialism. Even Sukarno earlier showed his appreciation on women’s rights through his book Sarinah: Kewadjiban Wanita dalam Pedjoangan Repoeblik Indonesia (Sarinah: Women’s obligations in the Struggle of the Republic of Indonesia). This book is based on the result of discussion materials on “Women Course” conducted every two weeks in Yogyakarta. “Thus,” Neng Dara stressed – wants to give an irony- “if at that time Sukarno was already aware that the issue of women’s rights is a common issue (social issue), it would be so funny if at the present time there are people who consider woman issues as a marginal issue, which is not sexy, even for discussing.”

Meanwhile, Ulil Abshar Abdalla who is also the speaker in the discussion opened his talk by appreciating UIN Maulana Malik Ibrahim Malang as a reflection of renewal campus which from the beginning has been dreamed by Muslim reformers, such as Kiai Haji Ahmad Dahlan. According to Ulil, who is one of the founders of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), the core of renewal that want to be conducted by Islamic leaders such as Muhammad Abduh is how the Muslim community maintains its authenticity as a Muslim, without closing himself/herself toward modernity. “We are Muslim, and at the same time, we are modern,” Ulil explained. In NU’s own tradition, we can find the term al-muhâfadhah ‘ala al-qadîmi al-Salih al-akhdzu bi wa al-Jadid al-ashlah (to maintain good traditions and adopt new better one).
Based on that reason, Ulil also intended to transmit his optimism to the participants of the discussion that Indonesia has the opportunity to be the center of Islamic thoughts in the international field. He stated his objection on the result of research conducted by two scholars from Washington about how far Islam has colored Muslim countries. They viewed this from a variety of criteria, such as recognition of minority rights, tolerance, pluralism, transparency of governance systems, etc. In this research, Indonesia ranked under Malaysia. According Ulil, the rank of Indonesia should be much more above Malaysia, at least if we look at the various developments that we have today. Yet, Ulil stressed his belief by quoting Fazlur Rahman’s statement that the future of the Islamic world actually exists in Indonesia, not in Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, Ulil – one of the researchers at the Freedom Institute - stated his optimism on the potency of development of Islamic world in the hand of Indonesia because so far Indonesia has been successful to conquer serious challenges that might not be faced by other countries when they experienced a political transition. Based on his observations, when a country experienced a political transition, it would deal with dangerous phases that can threaten the governmental stability. As the result, a country in transition is easy to balkanization, a phenomenon of disintegration caused by the spread of separatism. The most representative example is the experience of the Soviet Union and the countries in the Middle East. Ulil continued, “While Indonesia has been successful in passing the transition without losing much. Maybe we immediately think of Timor Leste, but it is just an exception. In fact, Indonesia remains the state of unity until now.” Ulil believes that the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) movement has an important role in this issue. NU community has at first agreed to political ijtihad of the predecessor, KH Ahmad Siddiq who declared that Indonesia is a final state. Thus, Indonesian Muslims do not need to imitate the form of government in other Islamic countries. “Declaration initiated Siddiq Ahmad, Rais Am NU at that time (1984) was an effective strategy in growing the awareness of society nationalism through the legitimacy of religion,” Ulil expressed his pride of noble traditions that have been built by NU since its 27th Muktamar (Congress) in 1984.

Besides the fact above, Indonesia successfully passed the transition without a military coup. We can see the appalling conditions suffered by Egypt when the country experienced a period of transition from authoritarian government to democracy system. When Husni Mubarak’s government was successfully overthrown, Egypt still continued to experience a great upheaval caused by the community resistance to a new leadership carried by military. Indonesia is a little bit lucky because in the transition of reformation era was led by civil society, i.e. BJ Habibie. We cannot forget Habibie’s good deeds in his leadership as a civic leader. It is Habibie’s contribution on successfully creating important legislations such as Law on Regional Autonomy, the separation between TNI and police, etc.

Another development shown by Indonesia is society’s great support and participation to democracy. Several initiatives have been continuously done by society to support the discourse of democracy through various elements, such as figures of society, political parties, NGOs, Islamic Universities such as IAIN which have provided a substantial contribution in dealing with the discourse of democracy. Syarif Hidayatullah Islamic State University, for instance, published a kind of guide books on human rights. Another example, NU made a halaqah (group) which specifically focused on Jurisprudence of corruption.

As closing, Ulil added that there should be any efforts to continuously improve Indonesian’s achievements. One of efforts is to continuously develop the tradition of knowledge among scholars, so the above Fazlur Rahman’s statement is not just a compliment or meaningless hope. On that occasion, Ulil expressed his yearning on the intellectualism condition which grew in the 1970’s, a period in which the glory of Islamic thoughts occurred and Cak Nur and Gus Dur became the leaders. Today, Ulil sees that the tradition of that time (70s decade) has begun to fade. Therefore, Ulil, who is also one of the KEMI directors, wants to optimize the role of epistemic communities as a mediator that is expected to revive the glory of Islamic thoughts which ever grew a few decades ago.

Ulil also added that another effort should be made by scholars is to multiply works in English because English is the only mediator of the most effective way to expand our thinking in the international world. In addition, Ulil continued, we must also struggle to develop and increase scientific journals that can be used as a reference of other people who want to learn about Indonesian Islam. The last effort which needs to be done is to open ourselves to any scientific approaches, whether it is a traditional or liberal approach. By opening ourselves to a variety of approaches, it hopefully stimulates a fruitful dialogue for the sake of the development of our knowledge in the future. By doing these efforts, Ulil asserted his belief that Indonesia can fulfill Prof. Fazlur Rahman’s statement i.e. a model of international Islamic state, like a lighthouse that has the ability to light up other Islamic worlds.

Meanwhile, Dr. Lutfi Mustafa, a professor of Philosophy at UIN Malang Maulana Malik Ibrahim who was also the speaker at the discussion, explained the history of renewal and its phases. According to him, the first phase of renewal in Islam was in the 17th-18th century started by an awareness of the internal condition of Islam which declined even further behind Western societies. In the next phase, renewal was motivated by colonialism. The spread of colonialism in many Muslim worlds revived the passion of society in the Islamic world community to do renewal.

At this point, Mustofa Lutfi wanted to bring the participants to the same hope: renewal of Islamic thoughts in Indonesia is nothing but the common wish of this nation in building a more mature people to introduce to the pattern of a more harmonious relationship between state and religion, i.e. performing the face of religion that promotes universal values to support secularism in Indonesia.

* Student at UIN Sharif Hidayatullah; actively involved in the Institute for the Study of Religion and Philosophy (LSAF)

Sumiati has become the headline in Indonesia’s mass media not because of her particular achievement, but it is unfortunately due to the deepening and increasing concern over her fate. She is a victim of her employer’s torture in Saudi Arabia, one of the Middle Eastern countries wherein many Indonesian migrant workers prefer it as their prime destination to earn a living.

Mixed reactions emerge from the public. President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono denounced such cruelty and commanded the department in charge of labor to resolve this case soon.

Beside Sumiati, another Indonesian female worker (TKW) named Kikim Komalasari, was even murdered by her own employer. Kikim’s dead body was dumped in a rubbish bin in the Abha region, near Jeddah.

Many people in Indonesia were shocked and wondering how such brutality could take place in an Islamic country? Does not Islam respect women and the poor?
At least two factors may explain the background of the barbaric incident in Saudi Arabia in particular, and in the Middle East countries in general. The two factors are “women” and “the status of labor” (domestic workers).

Many women in the Middle Eastern countries endure heavy discrimination in their lives. Women do not live with the same rights like men. A Jordanian columnist Jihad Alawanah affirmed that women in the Middle Eastern countries are like refugees. They always expect political asylum from the men. First is from their fathers, and then from their husbands.

Their lives are very dependent upon the men. They do not attain the rights to make any decisions independently in most of their life. Hani Naqshbandi narrates women’s suffering in Saudi Arabia in his novel entitled al-Ikhtilas (snatch). This novel is translated into Bahasa Indonesia under title Perempuan Terpasung (the shackled women). In this novel, Hani narrates the story of women’s miseries in Saudi Arabia.

For unmarried women, fathers and brothers determine their fate. They must obtain permission from these men before doing anything. Even in the matter of marriage, women cannot choose their future husbands. Their fathers select the future husbands for them. Once married, their fate is entirely in the hands of their husbands. Ironically, the husbands often treat their wives as a pile of flesh in which they pay attention as far as their interests are concerned.

By living in Islamic countries, the Middle Eastern society should be able to learn how women were respected in early Islam. There are prominent female figures that play determinant roles throughout Muhammad’s Prophethood. One of this figures, Prophet Muhammad’s wife Khadijah, play an important role in ensuring that he did receive the true revelations instead of the satanic whispers. Khadijah encouraged him to believe this after she consulted her Christian priest cousin Waraqah bin Nawfal. Thus, how come the Muslim society now forget the important role of a woman named Khadijah?!

“When the word ‘renewal’ is associated with Islam, the renewal should not be Islam as a religion nor the Qur’an as a sacred book, but rather the renewal of the interpretation on both because a human interpretation of the Qur’an is not the Qur’an itself. It is just an interpretation upon it. Thus, changes of the interpretation of the Qur’an and of the religion are still possible. If the Qur’an is absolutely true, its interpretation still contains a lot of possibilities, including the possibility of mistakes. For that reason, as a product of Qur’anic interpretation, the truth of an interpretation is relative. ”  As the result, when someone believes in an interpretation, s/he not only can be conservative at the level of thought, but also can base his/her terror acts from the Qur’an, as terrorists did lately.

This is Abdul Moqsith Ghazali’s emphasis on renewal conveyed through a book titled “Renewal of Indonesian Islamic Thought” which for the first time was launched at IAIN Imam Bonjol Padang, November 22, 2011 ago. The book is an anthology of some Muslim intellectuals’ writings such as M. Dawam Rahardjo, Djohan Effendy, Abdul Moqsith Ghazali, Ulil Abshar-Abdalla, Neng Dara Affiah, Budhy Munawar-Rachman, Ihsan Ali Fauzi, etc. According to Moqsith, these writings bring a renewal agenda based on three basic or main thoughts: secularism, pluralism, and liberalism.

Abdul Moqsith Ghazali, who is known with his comprehensive understanding of fiqh and usul fiqh in explaining his liberal thoughts, affirmed in straightforward that secularism is the best solution to overcome the complexities of life in Indonesia. Secularism is an inevitable model when we position the relationship between religion and state. As a pluralistic country, Indonesia needs to develop a system of government which is able to accommodate all needs of a pluralistic state. On the contrary, it is not impossible that a lot of territories want to be separated from Indonesia when Indonesia was forced into a religious state. Because of the plurality of our nation with all its own local wisdoms, Islamization of the state becomes impossible. However, Moqsith added, “the proper secularism design for Indonesia is a secularism that is friendly to religion, like Canada, not like French model of secularism which is anti-religion and bans all religious symbols in public spaces.”

Concerning pluralism, Moqsith believes that pluralism needs to be maintained in Islam. According to him, who got a doctorate degree from UIN Sharif Hidayatullah Jakarta and published his dissertation as a book titled “Arguments on Religious Pluralism, Building Tolerance Based on Al-Quran”, the idea and the practice of pluralism in Islam still bring various problems. Many things must be renewed related to the way we see other religions and other groups. In fact, Islam itself grew in a pluralistic context. Even during his lifetime, the Prophet had a family from different religions and classes. Therefore, if pluralism is rejected, it is mean to oppose the basic concepts of Islam and the context of the Prophet’s life.

Although in the Scripture we found walan tardlo ‘ankal yahuudu walan nashaara hatta tattabi’a millatahum, should we also close our eye to another certainty explicitly states that the Qur’an really appreciates and justifies their (scripture) teachings? Do we deny the verse: waanzalnaa ilaikal kitaaba bilhaqqi mushaddiqan limaa bayna yadayhi minal kitaabi wamuhaiminan ‘alaihi fahkum bainahum bima anzala Allah? Moqsith challenged the participants to open their eyes to the view of the truth on other religions in God’s sight.

Meanwhile, when describing his ideas on liberalism, Moqsith, who is a lecturer at several universities in Indonesia as well as a Kyai for some students of Pesantren, also properly applied a historical approach of a local culture (West Sumatra). By tracing the historical events, there is a kind of proof how the roots of freedom of thought was firstly performed by a great scholar of West Sumatra, i.e. Kyai Haji Agus Salim. Moqsith told that a century ago, Kyai Haji Agus Salim became the pioneer of placing the foundation of liberal Islamic thought in Indonesia. He broke decisively the stability of the concept of hijab for woman and man. Agus Salim, Moqsith said, confirmed that man and woman do not need to be separated by a material veil, because the hijab of man and woman is his/her spirituality, his/her heart.

Moqsith expressed with a little praise his admiration for the uniqueness of West Sumatra, which can be regarded as a representation, a kind of ‘mini park’ of Islamic thought in Indonesia. In West Sumatra, we can trace the emergence of the great thinkers, from Islamists, such as Haji Agus Salim, until the communists, like Tan Malaka. Because of such diverse historical roots, it is no wonder if we can find different dualisms in the way people practice Islam in Padang.  The Issues of the implementation of Islamic Sharia, for instance, both rejecting and approving voices are all here, in Padang, West Sumatra. However, it is inevitable that Padang can be regarded as the birthplace of Islamic reformers in its history. Therefore, the renewal of Islamic thought is not only possible, but also it naturally occurs in the city of West Sumatra.

Besides Abdul Moqsith Ghazali, in the discussion and the book launching filled by a hundred participants, there was also a speaker from young intellectual group, Zelfeni Wimra. In her presentation, she, who is a lecturer at IAIN Imam Bonjol Padang as well as a writer of short stories, emphasized that if renewal is associated with Islam, we need to determine firstly the way of approaching Islam. Three approaches can be conducted: Islam as a faith, Islam as a movement, and Islam as a science. For Wimra, when people want to approach Islam as a faith, the consequence is that obedience must be there, sami’na wa atha’na. It will be different if they want to approach Islam as a movement, the emphasis is how the movement is re-evaluated and interpreted in order to find a suitable system for the Muslim community. Meanwhile, if renewal is done by approaching Islam as a ray of science, the consequence is a conflict because science itself was born from a conflict. Therefore, Wimra believes that Islam itself is a conflict religion. This is the reason why throughout the history of its beginning, Islam has always been accompanied by a conflict.

After questioning a starting point to conduct renewal, Wimra emphasized her belief that, “Renewal is necessary, especially with Islam as a starting point for the ray of science.” She believes that the Qur’an itself contains a sign for Muslim to be aware about the importance of continuously producing the interpretation. She mentioned one verse that tells about how the Qur’an challenged Quraish people when they doubted about the truth of the Qur’an. The Qur’an clearly urged them to bring only one greater verse, or at least a verse that has an equal quality with the Qur’an.

For Wimra, if people who opposed Islam were given an opportunity to respond to the Qur’anic verses, why can Muslims themselves not do that? Therefore, Wimra believes that the verse is a sign, a kind of entrance for Muslims to be more active to interpret the Qur’an as well as to explore its verses in order to be able to open a more contextual interpretation.

* Student of UIN Jakarta

Indonesian people have a custom or a tradition of congratulating religious celebration performed by every religious community. Mutual appreciation of such religious community has long been practiced in Indonesia. Muslims say “Merry Christmas” to their fellows who are Christians and the Christians congratulate ‘Eid’ to their colleagues who are Muslims. Frequently, a number of religious leaders send their greetings in a day of religious celebration via Short Message Service (SMS). This phenomenon is rarely happen in other Muslim countries. In fact, other Muslim countries should learn from Indonesian people how to perform religious tolerance towards people of other faiths.

Indeed, there has been a fatwa (religious decree) issued by some of Indonesian Muslim scholars that Muslims are forbidden to say “Merry Christmas” toward their Christian fellows. The fatwa is supported by several arguments. First, the tradition of greeting had never been exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad PBUH. Thus, it can be classified to a heretic practice (Bid’ah). It is said in a Hadith, “Kullu bid’atin dhalalatun, Wa Kullu dhalalatin fin-nar” [all heretical practices is wrong and all wrongs are going to hell]. In addition, Muslims are prohibited from innovating new things, such as performing religious greeting of Christmas.
Second, the tradition is seen as a justification for the truth of Christian faith. In fact, such justification is forbidden, and Muslims should not justify other’s truth. The tradition is seen as shaking the faith of Muslims because it seems to open up the possibility of “other” truth existed outside Islam. The scholars have frequently warned Muslims not to perform any activity that seems to give justification for any teaching which is incompatible with Islam. As quoted, there is a Quranic verse saying “inna al-din `inda Allah al-Islam, which is translated that the only religion which is true is Islam; the religion that is brought by the Prophet Muhammad PBUH. The scholars seem ignoring the existing universal value that is agreed by all religions. As I often write, that “al-islam” as texted in that verse does not refer to the “name” of religion brought the Prophet Muhammad PBUH.

However, as the fatwa is not binding, not all Muslims follow the fatwa of scholars and regard it as the only guidance. In fact, some Muslims still perform the tradition and maintain the custom. To me, Christmas Greeting for Muslims should be reviewed because of some following reasons: First, Christmas greeting is not automatically parallel or identical with the justification of Christian truth. The Christmas greeting can be identified as merely a social norm, not a theological belief. As a social norm, it can not be categorized as heretical. In the world of social interaction (mu’amalah duniawiyah), it is allowed to innovate. As far as related to social affairs, none of such practices can be categorized as heretical. The Prophet Muhammad said, “antum a’lamu minni bi dunyakum” [you know more about your worldly (duniawiyah) affairs].

In certain contexts, to say “Merry Christmas” is beneficial. It functions as knitting efforts to strengthen social harmony and solidarity among religions society in Indonesia. All religious communities should be in mutual respect and appreciate others. To congratulate religious celebration is one of ways to maintain such social harmony among different religious communities. It seems as merely symbolic, indeed, but such symbols are significant to maintain in order to reduce conflict and tension between different faiths.

Second, in the Qur’an (Surah Maryam [19]: 33) it is mentioned that the Prophet Isa al-Masih once said, “wa al-salam ‘alayya yauma wulidtu yauma amutu wa wa yauma ub’atsu Hayya” [best wishes for me on the day of my birth, my funeral, and my resurrection]. In this verse, al-Qurtubi said that this verse means, God also congratulated the birth of Jesus (Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami ‘li Ahkam al-Qur’an, Volume VI, p.. 96)

The congratulations are not only given to the Prophet Jesus. Al-Qur’an congratulated other prophets as well. For the Prophet Noah, Al-Qur’an (Surat al-Shaffat [37]: 79) says, “Salamun ‘ala Nuh fi al’- Alamin” (greetings for the Noah amongst the universe); to Prophet Ibrahim (QS, al-Shaffat [37]: 109), “Salamun ‘ala Ibrahim” (greetings for the welfare of Abraham); to the Prophet Moses and Prophet Aaron (Surah al-Shaffat [37]: 120), “Salamun’ ala Musa wa Harun”  (greetings for the welfare of Moses and Aaron); for Prophet Ilyasin (Sura al-Shaffat [37]: 130), “Salamun ‘ala Ilyasin” (greetings for the welfare of the Prophet Ilyasin “. Not just the few that prophet, al-Qur’ an (Surat al-Shaffat [37]: 181) also congratulated to all messengers, “Salamun ‘ala al-Mursalin” may the welfare will be sent for all the messengers.
. Thus, for Muslims themselves, celebrating Christmas is really to celebrate the birthday of a messenger of God to be believed, Isa al-Masih, who was symbolically born in December 25th. As the implication of this faith to the Jesus, Muslims should also be allowed to celebrate the birth of Jesus and other prophets before Muhammad PBUH. Jesus is not only owned by Christian communally but also by all who believe in him. The Great figures such as Abraham, Moses, Jesus, and Muhammad do not belong to certain groups. Those figures can be examples and inspiration for anyone.

Celebrating Christmas for Muslims is allowed, so that saying “Merry Christmas” to Christian friends is also allowed. Christmas greeting is not specifically said for Christians, but also to anyone who believe in the prophecy of Jesus, including Muslims. (:)